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INTRODUCTION 
Prospects for sustained economic growth in the developed world are weak at best. Analysis of 
the US and UK economies reveals an ongoing implosion, with no signs of a reversion to 
acceptable growth rates in the absence of stimulus to effective demand. Furthermore, the 
sluggish performance in the Euro area, exacerbated by the damaging, pro-cyclical implications 
of the ‘Growth and Stability Pact’, suggests that stagnation is being allowed to persist here too. 
And there is not prospect of a recovery in growth in Japan.  
Unlike other periods when faltering economies were propped up by growth among other 
northern countries, there is now the risk of an orchestrated decline in the developed world. It 
may have  been hoped that the U.S. would continue to play the role of ‘importer (and perhaps 
employer) of last resort’. However, a substantial part of this study is devoted to suggest that, 
given conditions at present, this is no more than wishful thinking. Indeed, in the absence of 
active policy at a world level, there is an imminent risk of a large-scale recessionary spiral.  
                                                
? ? This paper rests on work commonly shared with Wynne Godley at the Cambridge Endowment for 
Research in Finance, CERF, University of Cambridge. The author is indebted to Godley’s pioneering 
insights and dedicated attention to these issues. The support of the CERF team was invaluable. Discussions 
with former colleagues at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College and with Bill Martin of UBS Global 
Asset Management were very helpful. Usual disclaimer applies. 
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This new situation reveals the true nature of the globalisation process.  The enthusiasm for 
globalisation grew at a time when some of the northern economies were booming. Then, it was 
the norm to single out crises elsewhere as the consequence of an individual country’s mistakes 
alone, or – at best – of an incomplete exposure to the beneficial effects of globalisation. But 
with the world economy now slowing down, globalisation may have adverse consequences1.  
The implications of policy inaction for the developing world could be devastating. Below-
capacity growth in the northern hemisphere would translate, first, into lower import demand, 
perhaps a 10% net-import retrenchment. Second, unemployment would bring lower income 
remittances to the southern hemisphere and probably more severe immigration restrictions. 
Finally, capital flows to developing countries would drain away, either because of negative 
saving gaps in countries such as the US and the UK, or because demand for portfolio 
investments in the southern hemisphere has deteriorated (FitzGerald, 2002). 
It is, however, possible to regard this global impasse as a unique opportunity. Co-ordinated 
expansionary policies might be advocated and even implemented. This is not a popular idea. 
Fiscal policy has long been stigmatised as the cause of policy failure and economic downturn. 
Unfortunately, the fashion for fiscal restraint has ignored serious analytical and empirical 
arguments to the contrary2. It is misleading in two respects. First, it overlooks the recurring 
evidence that the most severe economic crises of the recent past have not been associated with 
public-sector excess but with private-sector failures (Vos, 1995; Stiglitz, 1998; Izurieta, 
2000). Second, it overlooks the fact that the US is today offsetting a potentially severe 
recession with  fiscal relaxation equivalent to 4.75 percent of GDP in the past eight quarters.  
In the following section the structural problems of the U.S. economy will be analysed. The 
methodology replicates the approach pioneered by Wynne Godley and his former colleagues at 
                                                
1  I am not discussing whether the ongoing global liberalisation would yield a more uneven division of 
global produce (Baker, Epstein and Pollin, 1998, and many other studies), and would lead to increasing 
volatility and financial risk (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; Singh, 1999). This paper seeks to explore the strategic 
prospects of a slowdown in the developed world and its implications for developing economies.  
2  See, among many others: Nell (1988), Killick (1989), Crotty (1989), Anglade and Fortín (1990), Stern 
(1991), Taylor (1993), Fazzari (1995), Godley and McCarthy (1998). 
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the University of Cambridge and subsequently the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
Underlying this framework is the notion that the study of an economy requires a proper system 
of accounts, which fully incorporates both flows and stocks. The following section will discuss 
some strategic solutions as suggested by a macroeconomic model of t he US (a revised update 
of Godley, 1999c). The final section will underscore the policy option of a co-ordinated global 
reflation as the means to avoid concurrent, large-scale implosion. 
 
THE U.S. ECONOMY: A STRUCTURAL VIEW 
The structure of demand during the expansion 
The US economy experienced a relatively long period of expansion between 1992Q2 and 
2000Q3. Many observers believed this to be permanent. They argued that economic prosperity 
would be uninterrupted, since it was based on the correct combination of productivity growth, 
fiscal discipline and minimal policy intervention.  
The evidence is summarised in Charts 1–3. GDP growth and productivity growth during the 
1992–2000 period, and their apparent correlation, are captured in Chart 1. At the 2000Q2 
peak, the average rate of growth over the previous eight-and-a-half years was 3.8 percent, and 
the rate of productivity growth, estimated over the same period, was 2.1 percent. It is 
noteworthy that these figures were not unprecedented. Moreover, the growth peak of 3.8 per 
cent is merely half a percentage point higher than the growth average of the entire post-war 
period (3.3 percent). Yet, from the perspective of that peak, it was tempting to believe that the 
economic expansion caused by faster productivity would maintain its upward trend, perhaps 
indefinitely. 
 
A. I ZURIETA  -  CERF ;  U NIVERSITY  OF  C AMBRIDGE  5
Chart 1: GDP and Productivity Growth in the U.S. 
 
It was expected that leading industries (like the IT sector) would follow the pace dictated by the 
so-called Moore’s Law for semiconductors3. Needless to say, such exuberant expectations 
drove the stock market boom and, with it, the avalanche of windfall gains to portfolio holders. 
Coincidentally, the free, unregulated, private-sector driven IT and internet sectors served to 
corroborate the notion that the forces of economic growth would gain momentum without 
active fiscal and monetary policies4. 
                                                
3  Gordon Moore, from Intel Corporation, once claimed that developments in electronic chip 
manufacturing would be able to double their density and, thus, performance every eighteen months.  
4  See, for example, Cecchetti (2002). Underlying the orthodox notion of the supremacy of markets over 
policy, a new theme seems to be recurrent: that by tightly reining fiscal policy, monetary policy would itself 
become less influential, because of the increasing reduction of public debt and thus the weaker influence of its 
interest rates on financial markets. 
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Chart 2: Standardised Budget Surplus as per cent of Potential GDP 
 
The retreat of fiscal policy is apparent in Chart 2, which illustrates the standardised budget 
surplus (as calculated by the Congressional Budget Office, CBO). This measures the extent to 
which policy-making has tightened the fiscal stance independent of the effect of the cycle on 
spending and tax revenue. As may be seen the expansion of the 1990s (between vertical lines) 
occurred alongside the most restrictive fiscal stance in at least four decades.  
During the same period, monetary policy intervention was minimal. After a measured 
adjustment of interest rates in tune with the beginning of the recovery in 1992, policy makers 
left the markets to regulate themselves. As Chart 3 shows, the average of the absolute deviation 
of interest rates (on Treasury bills) from the mean over any 32-quarter period was, in the 
aftermath of the expansion (fourth quarter of 2000, marked by the vertical line) the lowest in 
the previous three decades. Only during the 1960s was there similar stability, but then fiscal 
policy was actively expansionary, as also evident in Chart 2. 
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Chart 3: The Pace of Monetary Policy Intervention 
 
Thus, whereas economic growth and productivity during 1992–2000 were not unprecedented, 
the particular configuration of expectations, market forces and policy (in-action) were indeed 
novel.  
Most importantly, the composition of demand was unique. The main accounting relationships 
are revealed by disaggregating the economy into its main sectors (private, public and external). 
The resultant accounting identity reveals both the financial balances of the main sectors and the 
contributions of net spending to aggregate demand. Starting from the basic notion that total 
income is identical, ex-post, to total expenditure; and expressing the latter as the sum of 
aggregate demand components, we have: 
 ( )Y PX G X M NF? ? ? ? ?  
where PX stands for total pr ivate expenditure (consumption and investment); G is total 
government expenditure; and X, M and NF are exports, imports and net factor incomes from 
abroad. Subtracting taxes on both sides and rearranging:  
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 ( ) ( )Y T PX G T X M NF? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
Since Y – T is private disposable income, the LHS defines the private-sector balance; while the 
right hand side represents the sum of the general government deficit and the current account 
balance, i.e.  
Private balance ? Public-sector Borrowing Requirements + Balance of Payme nts 
Any two of these balances necessarily implies the third. The identity also denotes that the two 
net demands on the RHS (public-sector net spending, after tax income, and net export-
demand), ‘create income and financial assets for the private-sector, whereas budget surpluses 
and balance of payments deficits withdraw income and destroy financial assets’ (Godley, 
1999c, pp. 8). 
The balances of the main sectors, expressed as percent of GDP, are shown in Chart 4. The 
boom coincided with unprecedented behaviour in the three sectors. From 1992 (the beginning 
of the last expansionary cycle) until the third quarter of 2000, the balance of the private-sector 
moved from a positive (i.e. net- saving) 6% of GDP to a negative (net- borrowing) 6% of GDP. 
The deteriorat ion of the private balance (12 percentage points of GDP, or $1.2-trillion at 
today’s prices) is matched by the sum of 8 percentage points’ withdrawal of public-sector 
outlays relative to revenue and 4 percentage points of increased imports relative to exports. At 
the end of the expansion, the three balances had attained  record values.  
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Chart 4: Financial Balances of the Main Sectors of the U.S. Economy  
 
The downward trend of both the government deficit and the current account balance have  (net-) 
negative impact on demand, while the downward trend of the private-sector balance (total 
expenditure growing faster than income) is a demand stimulus. Thus, the sole force of 
economic expansion was the private-sector.  
Since spending in excess of income can be sustained only either by selling financial assets or 
by a growing flow of net- credit, it is legitimate to question whether the expansion, under these 
conditions, could be sustained (Papadimitriou et al, 2002; Godley & Izurieta, 20002a,b,c; 
2001a,b; Papadimitriou & Wray, 2001; Godley & Martin, 1999; Godley & Wray, 1999). 
The private-sector as a whole cannot liquidate financial assets and, simultaneously, sustain an 
economic expansion. Concurrent sales of financial assets would result in a stock market 
collapse with consequent capital losses. A market crash would also affect the state of 
expectations (forcing agents to adjust their balances rather than encouraging extravagance). 
And deteriorating net-wealth would adversely affect the ability of private agents to raise credit.  
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The flow of net-credit to the private-sector cannot continue to grow forever. At some point an 
economy driven by private spending in excess of current income must slow down. 
Private-sector debt: fuelling the expansion… and the decline 
In Chart 5 I have assembled the private balance plotted above with the flow of net-lending to the 
non-financial private-sector, both as percent of GDP.  
 
Chart 5: Private Balance and Credit Flow  
 
Chart 6: Private Debt Stock  
 
The excess of private spending over current income between 1992 and 2000 was propelled by a 
rise of net-flows of credit. As expected, the debt stock of the private-sector, relative to 
disposable income, accelerated during the same period5 (Chart 6).  
The above analysis of the boom is now the basis of the explanation of the recession. The 
recession that began at the end of 2000 was the result of a fall of (aggregate) private 
expenditure relative to income. This was caused by the slowdown of the net-flow of credit. 
However, despite the slowdown, net-flows remained positive, and consequently the stock of 
debt, in proportion to income, kept on rising (though at a different pace). 
                                                
5  A growing flow of credit (required to sustain a credit-fuelled expansion) is tantamount to a debt 
acceleration (the flow being a first derivative of the stock). Meanwhile, a stable, positive credit flow would still 
generate a growing stock of debt (Godley 2002c, Godley & Izurieta 2002c).  
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To understand the unique nature of this process more clearly divide the private-sector into 
corporations and the personal sector. It is noteworthy that the main features of the corporate 
sector (namely: the financial balance moving to negative territory during the expansion, the 
net-flows of credit rising (Chart 7) and debt stocks accumulating (Chart 8)) are not 
intrinsically different than over previous cycles. Generally, corporations tend to finance their 
working capital by borrowing (a process that is intensified during expansions,) and refrain from 
doing so when they face adverse conditions. They show a readiness to adjust by reducing costs, 
employment, and inventories.  
Chart 7: Corporate Balance and Credit Flow  
 
Chart 8: Corporate Debt Stock  
 
Indeed, the rapid restoration of the corporations’ financial balance followed a shift in direction 
of net-borrowing, where the balance and the net-flow of credit both approached zero. Through 
this process, corporations slashed costs (related to the rise of unemployment), curbed 
investment, and even used available funds to purchase their own equity. This is a double-edged 
sword. By adjusting spending and servicing debt in line with the credit restraint, firms hoped to 
regain financial health. However, they have reduced the spending stream that had contributed to 
the expansion. From their perspective, the absence of new, exogenous forces of demand to 
replace their own withdrawal meant that further adjustment was necessary, creating a 
downward, deflationary spiral… 
A blind belief in the ‘resilience of corporate America’ has overlooked these basic facts, 
instead focussing on productivity increases to promote a rapid restoration of economic growth 
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to full potential and, perhaps, beyond6. However, a combination of excess capacity, sluggish 
demand arising from almost all other sectors and high unemployment followed by faster 
productivity-potential will cause more lay-offs, a lower state of confidence and, eventually, a 
persistent recession.  
Producers need demand to be generated by an exogenous force. This role was substantially 
played by the personal sector. The (net-) stream of credit inflows that nourished both 
consumers and producers started to dry up for corporations. Thus, following the implosion that 
started in mid-2000, the personal sector was left acting as a ‘consumer of last resort’. It was 
doing so by excessive overspending. Chart 9 shows that the financial balance of the personal 
sector (the net of cash-income flows after total expenditure) was rapidly deteriorating, 
entering negative territory for first time in at least fifty years. But, this source of demand is 
also receding. The unprecedented imbalance could only be maintained by an increasing flow of 
credit, or by selling financial assets (Chart 9). Such a process cannot continue forever. 
                                                
6  See Hale (2002), Jerman and Quadrini (2002) and others. 
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Chart 9: Personal S. Balance & Credit Flow  
 
Chart 10: Personal S.  Debt Stock  
 
 
On the one hand, greater efforts to sell assets results both in price falls and in the inability of 
other sectors, particularly corporations, to absorb the excess supply. There might have been 
scope for foreigners to keep buying US assets (‘thus ‘borrowing our way out of recession’, as 
correctly observed by D’Arista, 2001)7. Yet, the US has now reached a net liability position 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world of c. 25% of GDP. Predicting the cyclical patterns of equity 
sales observed in Chart 9 and considering that outstanding amounts of equities directly held by 
the personal sector have halved during the last ten quarters,8 one could conclude that such a 
source of funding is unreliable at best. 
On the other hand, households have benefited from an increasing flow of net-credit, readily 
available to them even beyond the peak of 2000. As is widely known, this comprises mortgage 
borrowing (and refinancing), consumer credit and recent zero-interest rate payment schemes 
                                                
7  Further, D’Arista points out that foreigners would not buy directly from households but via market 
pools. Yet, in the end, it would be these purchases that underpinned mortgage borrowing. One way or another, 
the demand for assets expressed by foreign investors allowed domestic agents to spend at a faster pace than 
their current income streams. 
8  Flow of Funds, Table L.100, line 17. 
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for durables and cars. Concurrently, the debt stock of the personal sector as ratio to disposable 
income is still accelerating (Chart 10).  
This unprecedented pattern has continued because of the over-valuation of the stock market and 
of real estate, inflating the net-worth of households during the period of ‘irrational 
exuberance’. Until recently, economic rationalism approved of lending to households at a 
faster rate than income, since their net-wealth was rising at an even faster pace. And so it was. 
Market players were fascinated by the virtuous cycle of higher productivity, aggressive 
consumer demand, credit expansion and a booming stock market. And, over the past six years, 
households’ net-wealth has risen one-and-a-half times their disposable income (Chart 11). It 
was a spectacular rise, which suspended judgement about the vertiginous accumulation of debt. 
But, in half the time it took to reach such a record level, the ratio of net-wealth to disposable 
income slid to the post-war average. Conceding, for the sake of argument, that it was rational to 
lend recklessly on the way up, one would expect a drastic credit cutback on the way down. 
Chart 11: Net-Wealth as a ratio to Personal Disposable Income  
There is no doubt that a credit implosion is imminent. This prognosis can be validated by using 
yet another indicator: the ratio of debt to net-wealth (Chart 12). During the period of economic 
expansion, both creditors and borrowers found this ratio attractive; it showed a decreasing 
trend, unparalleled in scale and duration. However, a slide in the debt to net-wealth ratio should 
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have been a reason for concern rather than excitement. For the denominator of this ratio is 
constructed on the fragile foundation of speculative valuations, which can change overnight. 
But debts have to be serviced with cash. In a deflation, fluctuations in portfolio valuations can 
have devastating implications for net-debtors, as may be seen in Chart 12. The debt to net-
wealth ratio has shifted dramatically upwards. It has climbed as quickly in the last ten quarters  
as it had over the twenty-seven years  before the previous peak.  
Chart 12: Ratio Debt to Net-Wealth of the Personal Sector  
 
To sum up, private-sector spending beyond income was the sole cause of the US expansion 
during the 1990s. The boom was entirely due to the ever-growing debt of the private-sector. 
The scale and duration of the expansion were not extraordinary, but since it was driven by a 
single sector, the pace of spending needed to be so much in excess of income that it required 
an unsustainable accumulation of debt. If borrowing were to slow down or even reverse, the US 
economy would be left with no expansionary impulse from the demand side. In my opinion, 
this is inevitable, since, even if the cost of servicing the debt is low, the debt burden canno t 
continue to accelerate indefinitely. The private-sector imbalance must eventually be resolved. 
This has begun to happen.  
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Fiscal policy did matter 
The current slowdown in the US economy would be more dramatic if both monetary and fiscal 
policy had not come to the rescue9. Charts 2 and 3 above reveal that there was a clear change in 
the direction of policy as soon as the symptoms of decline became alarming (as manifest in 
stock market losses, rising unemployment figures and signs of deflation). By mid–2001, when 
revised NIPA figures were released, there was no doubt that the economy was in difficulty and 
active policy intervention was intensified.  
It should be noted that the main effects of monetary relaxation should not be overestimated, 
indeed they may be ambiguous. In a nutshell: monetary policy would, at best, be working in the 
same direction characterised above as unsustainable. Lower interest rates and attractive 
financing packages simply encourage private-sector overspending for a while longer – and are 
anyhow bounded by zero interest rates (Godley, 2002c).  
It was fiscal policy that dramatically changed the entire post-boom landscape. The change of 
direction, from fiscal restraint to expansion, has been so aggressive that it is a record in its 
own right. The reversion to the cyclically adjusted budget plotted in Chart 2 (which goes up to 
2001 in CBO estimates), is not the end of the story. By 2002Q3 (using the last available 
official figures), the fiscal balance has changed over only eight quarters by 4.75 percentage 
points of GDP. The size of the change from surplus to deficit is, at today’s prices, almost 
exactly $500-billion. As Chart 13 shows, this remarkable shift into deficit was the second 
most aggressive two-year expansionary move in the last fifty years!10 
                                                
9  In previous reports (Godley, 1999c, Godley and Izurieta, 2001a,b, 2002a,b,c) a series of simulations 
have indicated the plausible range of outcomes once the implosion begins, in the absence of policy intervention. 
In sum, our exercises have shown that, without policy intervention, the average growth rate would be around 
one or one-and-a-half percent over the next five years, with unemployment reaching untenable figures (higher 
than eight per cent in all cases). 
10  The graph shows the change in public-sector borrowing requirements over any two-year period, scaled 
by the GDP. If instead the constant price deficit were shown (i.e. chained prices, 1995 base) the present 
expansionary move would be by far the largest of the post-war period, almost twice that of mid-1970s.  
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Chart 13: Fiscal Expansionary Moves Over Each 8 Quarter Period  
Within the $500-billion switch in the fiscal balance the ex-post effect of output fluctuations 
on the budget must be distinguished from the ex-ante policy-determined injection. The 
estimated effect of the economic slowdown on the budget over the last two years is around 
$100 billion per annum (Godley and Izurieta 2002c, pp.2 11). Thus, the cyclically corrected, 
effective policy relaxation over the last two -year period would be c. $300billion (3 percentage 
points of the GDP). It still remains a mystery why this extraordinary policy shift has attracted 
so little attention. 
The extent of the fiscal relaxation implemented during this period matches that proposed in 
previous papers (Godley and Izurieta, 2001a,b) as an alternative to implosion. The fiscal 
stimulus has boosted personal sector disposable income at an estimated average rate of around 
3 percent greater than GDP. Such a significant income injection was channelled, at least 
partially, into the spending stream and has saved the U.S. economy from a severe, lasting 
recession. We argued, however, that for fiscal relaxation to restore growth to an acceptable, 
                                                
11  The CBO suggests a very similar figure. 
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
19
54
01
19
56
01
19
58
01
19
60
01
19
62
01
19
64
01
19
66
01
19
68
01
19
70
01
19
72
01
19
74
01
19
76
01
19
78
01
19
80
01
19
82
01
19
84
01
19
86
01
19
88
01
19
90
01
19
92
01
19
94
01
19
96
01
19
98
01
20
00
01
20
02
01
   
D
iff
er
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
8 
qu
ar
te
rs
, i
n 
pe
rc
en
t o
f G
D
P 
  
A. I ZURIETA  -  CERF ;  U NIVERSITY  OF  C AMBRIDGE  18
historic standard, it ought to be accompanied by a similar stimulus from the trade balance. 
Otherwise,  in due course the fiscal expansion will need to be impossibly large. 
 
RECOVERY SCENARIOS FOR THE U.S. AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD  
With the usual disclaimer of how little we can know of future developments, I would like to 
suggest some possible scenarios for the medium-term horizon. I have made use of a revised 
and updated stock-flow macro-econometric model of the US, streamlined to the minimum 
amount of accounting and behavioural relations that would still be capable of capturing the 
main features and strategic perspectives described above 12. Throughout these experiments, my 
assumptions have been moderately conservative;  such as a stable, positive (though low) net-
flow of credit to the private-sector, stationary stock market valuations, low inflation and 
gradually growing real estate prices. Other exogenous variables would be expected to follow 
their (average) historic pace.  
The main differences between alternative scenarios are determined by the emphasis given to 
domestic policy and external dynamism. In summary the three alternatives are: first, a non-
recovery scenario in the absence of policy changes; second, recovery by means of fiscal policy 
alone; and finally, recovery by a combination of fiscal policy and external expansion. The 
underlying structures of demand for each scenario are plotted in Chart 14. The first, absence-
of-policy scenario carries the suffix ‘0’, the second, fiscal-policy-alone scenario has the suffix 
‘1’ and the final, combined solution of fiscal and external expansion has the suffix ‘2’.   
 
                                                
12  See Godley (1999c) and successive Levy Economic Institute’s and CERF’s reports (Godley and 
Izurieta, 2001a,b, 2002a,b,c). 
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Chart 14: Estimated Scenarios for Recovery  
 
The solutions illustrate the following stylised facts: 
a) The baseline scenario precludes further monetary and fiscal policy (while keeping 
interest rates low and allowing moderate tax relaxation). On the basis of the 
assumptions outlined above, and given a slowdown in private spending, the US economy 
would not be able to maintain its historical pace of growth. The average rate over the 
next five years would not be higher than 1½ percent. Unemployment would rise, rapidly 
approaching untenable figures. This is a ‘growth-recession’ scenario (Godley and 
Izurieta, 2002a, 2002d) in which growth rates need not be negative. 
b) With the growth-recession scenario the private-sector would slowly move to a balanced 
position and the only net addition to demand would come from the fiscal deficit. The 
external balance would remain negative (since no variations in world-demand or the 
exchange-rate are assumed) but the income elasticity of import-demand would be a 
-8.0%
-4.0%
0.0%
4.0%
8.0%
12.0%
19
90
01
19
92
01
19
94
01
19
96
01
19
98
01
20
00
01
20
02
01
20
04
01
20
06
01
( P
er
  c
en
t  
o
f  
G
D
P
  )
General Government Deficit
 Current Account Balance
Private S. Fin. Balance
g0
g2
g1
p0
p2
p1
c0
c2
c1
A. I ZURIETA  -  CERF ;  U NIVERSITY  OF  C AMBRIDGE  20
factor in partially dampening the increasingly negative trend13. Under these conditions, 
U.S. global import-demand would hardly grow. If one considers that economies 
worldwide are structured on the basis of 3% US growth the knock-on effect worldwide, 
after accounting for successive feedback, could be substantial14.  
c) Consider now the scenario labelled ‘1’. In order for the economy to grow sufficiently 
so as to prevent any further rise in unemployment by means of fiscal policy alone, the 
already large government deficit would have to grow further. The private-sector would, 
in all probability, return to its historical, balanced position (disposable income would 
rise along with the expansion, but spending will not rise at the same speed due to the 
heavy debt burden). It follows from accounting and economic logic that the current 
account balance would become largely negative - economic expansion at the historical 
average would increase imports at the current pace, with no assumed change in export 
demand. Various exercises yield an external imbalance of between eight and ten per cent 
of GDP (allowing for moderate outflows of factor payments). In five years the net 
foreign liabilities of the U.S. would have reached near fifty per cent of GDP. 
d) The growth-by-fiscal -policy-alone scenario (suffix ‘1’) would reproduce, on a much 
larger scale, the twin deficits experienced in the 1980s. But a medium term fiscal 
deficit of more than ten percent of GDP and a current account imbalance in the range of 
eight to ten percent of GDP are most unlikely. The political establishment and the 
American public would resist. Also, an increasingly negative asset position vis-à-vis 
foreign lenders and investors (the counterpart of the accumulation of current account 
deficits) would make the entire system ever more vulnerable to investor’s preference 
and interest rate changes.  
e) Finally, the scenario delineated with suffix ‘2’ in Chart 14 seems attractive. It was 
constructed to achieve historic growth rates by means of a combined fiscal relaxation 
and an injection of demand from net exports. Fiscal policy could consist of a mix of tax 
relief and social spending (to the extent that these measures are addressed to 
                                                
13  This scenario is based on the very conservative assumption that net-factor payments to the rest of the 
world would remain very limited, though the net-external liability position of the U.S. is by now c.25% of the 
U.S. GDP.  
14  Since an updated version of the world models used previously was not available (Godley, 1996; Vos 
and Izurieta, 1993), it would be bold to offer a reasonable estimate of the shock. In any case, the final impact 
on global export-demand to developing countries would be larger than the initial 3 percent withdrawal. 
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expenditure-sensitive sectors). The income and employment effects would be 
beneficial to all.  If the tax scheme was well-calibrated and oriented towards lower 
income groups  and employment-creation incentives, aggregate demand would be 
reinforced without reproducing the negative savings characteristic of the 1990s15. The 
positive synergies generated by net-export demand and private-sector behaviour explain, 
in part, the declining fiscal deficit noted in Chart 14 after the initial injection.  
f) Under ‘normal conditions’, the net-export expansion could have been achieved by a 
substantial devaluation of the dollar - model simulations require at least a 30 percent 
devaluation vis à vis trading partners. Unfortunately, the exchange rate is not an 
‘exogenous’ policy instrument; and even if it could be ‘influenced’ by investors’ 
reactions to policy-makers’ statements, this is not a reliable means of conducting 
policy. Alternatively, since what matters to net-export demand is real exchange rates, 
current deflationary pressures may help. However, reaching a real exchange 
depreciation by deflation is not neutral. Deflation would impact negatively on debt -
holders, thus forcing them to subsequent withdrawals of spending. Furthermore, the 
relative improvement of terms of trade via deflation would probably fade away as 
trading partners in the northern hemisphere were also subject to perverse deflationary 
pressures. In particular, if there were an orchestrated deflationary process in the US and 
other developed countries, trading partners from the developing world would be forced 
to bear the largest part of the U.S. recovery. 
g) Thus, it seems that the ‘normal circumstances’ that can be generated in a model 
simulation exercise are distant from reality. There remains the possibility of generating 
a positive stimulus to net-export demand in the U.S. by faster growth on a global scale. 
But for this alternative to become plausible a drastic change of policy stance in the rest 
of the world is necessary. However, Euroland is now experiencing deflationary 
pressures reinforced by the Growth and Stability Pact. The UK is facing  structural 
imbalances similar to those affecting the US. Japan remains mired in a recession that 
began more than a decade ago. Indeed, many low growth economies are looking to the 
US to restore growth as ‘importer of last resort’. 
                                                
15  At the time of revising this paper (January 2003) a tax plan is being proposed by President Bush as if it 
were a ‘stimulus package’. But the plan, it is a regressive tax reform rather than a demand stimulus. This makes 
it more urgent to expand our analysis so as to enable an assessment of the effects on demand expansion of this 
and alternative stimulus packages. (Working paper forthcoming). 
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To sum up: the US economic downturn will have unpleasant consequences, domestic and 
worldwide, if alternative solutions cannot be found. One scenario predicts that the US could 
move from an unsustainable accumulation of private debt to untenable public-sector and 
external debt levels. In another scenario, if there is no change of policy stance in the developed 
world, the emerging and developing economies would be subject to severe adjustments to 
accommodate the sluggishness elsewhere. Yet a US recovery via devaluation may lead to 
policy retaliation, endless chains of devaluation, deflationary pressures, etc., eventually making 
of US recovery an ephemeral experiment. 
 
OPEN-END CONCLUSION: TOWARDS REHABILITATI NG FISCAL POLICY ON A GLOBAL SCALE 
On the basis of the analysis above, it may be possible to restore acceptable rates of economic 
growth in the U.S., but is certainly not inevitable. Moreover, even if it were only a question of 
choosing ‘the best growth strategy’, the implications of any of them are not without limitations 
and worrying consequences, at home and abroad. Recent expansion in the US was driven by 
imbalances that were allowed to persist much longer, and go much deeper, than the point at 
which both financial rebalancing and growth could be attained simultaneously and painlessly.  
As the same time, the world economy is contracting, exacerbated by the defeatist attitude of 
policy-makers who seem afraid to recognize that ‘policy matters’. 
Policy has mattered, as this study has shown, when a relaxation of the fiscal stance helped, 
initially at least, to resolve an unprecedented and hazardous combination of financial 
imbalances, debt and deflation. But, this seems only to be the preamble. Future developments 
will depend on acknowledging and assessing the role of fiscal policy and carefully 
implementing new strategies.  
This exercise could serve to shed light on problems faced by other economies; some of which 
are stifled by old orthodoxies that halt growth ‘just in case’ the ghost of inflation re-appears. 
For developing countries, there are major challenges ahead. Developing economies are not 
only the most in need, but also the most fiercely limited with respect to the exercise of policy 
discretion. Finally, were such a process of balanced reflation to take off, it would require the 
active co-ordination of policy makers globally since markets, created for competition, cannot 
do what they were never meant to deliver and what today is most required: a solution for all. 
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There is much work to do in order to pursue such an agenda. This paper has highlighted an 
analytical framework, pioneered by Wynne Godley and the Cambridge Economic Policy 
Group, further enhanced at the Levy Economics Institute and the Cambridge Endowment for 
Research in Finance. The analysis has not only proven useful in outlining the main, structural 
problems of economies such as the US and the UK. It may also be instrumental in devising 
strategic solutions. But, a more substantive contribution to enhancing demand at a global level 
is still pending. Forthcoming steps include revising and updating world-modelling tools for the 
empirical analysis of alternative scenarios under changing world conditions. Yet, it does not 
require a full world-model to realize that, facing a contracting world economy, a policy-
generated, global reflation is urgently required. 
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